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Abstract BAN logic, an epistemic logic for analyzing security protocols, contains an
unjustifiable inference rule. The inference rule assumes that possession of H(X) (i.e., the
cryptographic hash value of X ) counts as a proof of possession of X , which is not the case.
As a result, BAN logic exhibits a problematic property, which is similar to unsoundness,
but not strictly equivalent to it. We will call this property ‘unsoundness’ (with quotes). The
property is demonstrated using a specially crafted protocol, the two parrots protocol. The
‘unsoundness’ is proven using the partial semantics which is given for BAN logic. Because
of the questionable character of the semantics of BAN logic, we also provide an alternative
proof of ‘unsoundness’ which we consider more important.
Keywords BAN logic · Soundness · Two parrots protocol · Cryptographic hash function ·
Security protocol
1 Introduction
Formal analysis of security protocols requires one to reason about the knowledge of the
participants (principals) in the protocol. Critical for a security protocol is that it should
not only guarantee that certain information is communicated, but also that certain other
information is not communicated. For example, external observers should typically not be
able to infer session keys which are exchanged in a security protocol.
BAN logic [5, 7],1 introduced by Burrows, Abadi and Needham, is an epistemic logic2
crafted for analyzing security protocols. It models at an abstract level the knowledge of
the principals in a protocol. The principals are supposed to have only polynomially many
1 See Appendix A for a taxonomy of the papers presenting the BAN logic.
2 For a thorough treatment of epistemic logic, consult [16, 25].
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computational resources. It was the first logic of its kind, and has had a tremendous influence
on protocol analysis: it has helped revealing weaknesses in known protocols, and many logics
are based on it. This is not to say that there has been no criticism of BAN logic. For one
thing, a full semantics is lacking, and many attempts have been made to fix this problem
[2, 17, 21, 35, 27, 32, 33, 13]. Moreover, the logic fails to detect some very obvious protocol
flaws [26].
Though the semantics of BAN logic is generally considered unclear, it is for our purposes
important to note that BAN logic does have a partial semantics, which is defined over a part
of the formal language of BAN logic.3
The general consensus about BAN-descendant logics appears to be that these logics are
computationally sound (detected protocol flaws are indeed flaws), but certainly not compu-
tationally complete (they may fail to detect certain protocol flaws). Recent work includes
attempts to bridge the gap between the formal (i.e., BAN-descendant) approach and the
computational approach to security logics [1], and attempts to obtain completeness results
for BAN-descendant logics in a kind of Kripke-style semantics [10–12]. In the Multi-Agent
Systems world, BAN logic has been widely used (see for example, [3]).
In this paper we show a problem of BAN logic [5, 7] that has, to our knowledge, not
yet been identified, despite all research into formal protocol analysis. The problem is this:
BAN logic is not ‘sound’. That is, false statements can be obtained by the application of
existing inference rules from true assumptions. In Sect. 2 we will elaborate on the concept
of ‘unsoundness’. The problem is caused by one particular questionable inference rule. In
Sect. 2 we will also explain the reasoning mistake behind this questionable inference rule. As a
result of the reasoning mistake, the inference rule does not have a computational justification,
which is discussed in Sect. 3. Section 4 shows the protocol we use in our unsoundness proof
and Sect. 5 shows all inference rules used in our proof. Section 6 shows the actual proof. In
Sect. 7 we will give an alternative proof, but in the questionable semantics of BAN logic;
therefore, we regard our proof of Sect. 6 more important. We close with some remarks on
the relevance of our results.
2 Cryptographic hash functions and justified beliefs
A cryptographic hash function is a function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k which is computationally
feasible to compute, but for which the inverse is computationally infeasible. In particular,
computing the inverse of a hash function takes O(2k) operations. Thus, a cryptographic hash
function is one-way: it is computationally infeasible to construct a message x such that H(x)
yields a given value h [14].4
Cryptographic hash functions have a lot of applications, including password protection,
manipulation detection and the optimization of digital signature schemes. Unfortunately
however, the class of applications is sometimes overestimated. Consider for example the
following quote from security expert Schneier [30, p. 31]:
If you want to verify someone has a particular file (that you also have), but you don’t
want him to send it to you, then you ask him for the hash value. If he sends you the
correct hash value, then it is almost certain that he has that file.
3 This partial semantics is defined in Sect. 13 of the original BAN papers [5, 7].
4 For an extensive treatment of cryptographic hash functions, consult [28].
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Unfortunately, this claim is false. The problem is that in the above situation sketch, there
is no mention that the hash value of the file should be kept totally secret. If there is somebody
who is willing to publish the hash value of the file, anybody can ‘prove’ possession of the
file.
The authors of BAN logic [5, 7] made the same reasoning mistake as Bruce Schneier, and
incorporated into their logic an inference rule reflecting the above mentioned questionable
reasoning.5 The name of the questionable rule is H and the rule will be shown in Sect. 3. As
a result of this, BAN logic is not ‘sound’. Essential in our proof is the fact that belief in BAN
logic is considered to be justified belief.
But first, let us recapitulate what soundness is. A proof procedure is sound if it proves
only valid formulae. In particular, from justified (‘true’) formulae it should be impossible
to infer an unjustifiable (‘false’) formula. A proof of soundness generally involves a formal
system and a class of models (a semantics): a proof of soundness essentially shows that every
formula that is derivable (|−) in the formal system is observable (|) in all relevant models
of the semantics (i.e., S |−X implies s | X for all models s).
A related concept, ‘soundness’6 (S |−P |≡ X implies S |−X ) relies on the definition of
the modal operator belief (|≡) in BAN logic which denotes true justified belief. As opposed
to beliefs in general, a true justified belief should be true. To see what the authors of BAN
logic consider belief, let us look at the following excerpt from [9, page 7]:
More precisely, define knowledge as truth in all states (as in [18]7); our notion of belief
is a rudimentary approximation to knowledge, and it is simple to see that if all initial
beliefs are knowledge then all final beliefs are knowledge and, in particular, they are
true.
In this paper, we will first prove ‘unsoundness’ in Sect. 6 and then unsoundness (without
quotes) in Sect. 7. In our ‘unsoundness’ proof, all initial beliefs are clearly knowledge, though
one of the obtained final beliefs is not knowledge, in particular, it is false. Thus, by inferring
an unjustified belief in BAN logic from true assumptions, we prove that BAN logic is not
‘sound’. In particular, this means that it is impossible to create a semantics in which BAN
logic is sound.
We will adhere to the convention of BAN logic to talk about the beliefs of the principals
as if they are not necessarily also knowledge. Which is appropriate, as the initial beliefs may
fail to be knowledge. However the claim that true initial beliefs and BAN inferences will
result in nothing but true beliefs, turns out to be unwarranted. The culprit is an unwarranted
BAN inference rule, which we discuss in the next section.
3 On the computational justification of beliefs
In the analysis of security protocols, if a principal obtains a new belief, there has to be a
computational justification for the newly obtained belief. For example, if a principal sees a
message cryptographically signed with private key K −1, it is justified to believe that the mes-
sage originates from the principal owning private key K −1. The computational justification
is in this case that it is computationally infeasible for principals other than the one owning
5 See Appendix A for a detailed discussion of the papers presenting BAN logic, and which papers exactly
contain the reasoning mistake.
6 Note the quotes, which distinguish ‘soundness’ from soundness.
7 This is a reference to a preliminary paper. The final paper is [19]—WT.
123
Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst (2009) 19:76–88 79
private key K −1 to construct a message signed with this key. This type of justification is
essential if security is of concern.8
With this consideration in mind, it is worth noting the following excerpt from page 266
of the BAN paper [5], (resp. pages 41–42 of [7]):
Obviously, trust in protocols that use hash functions is not always warranted. If H is
an arbitrary function, nothing convinces one that when A has uttered H(m) he must
have also uttered m. In fact, A may never have seen m. This may happen, for instance,
if the author of m gave H(m) to A, who signed it and sent it. This is similar to the way
in which a manager signs a document presented by a subordinate without reading the
details of the document. However, the manager expects anyone receiving this signed
document to behave as though the manager had full knowledge of the contents. Thus,
provided the manager is not careless and the hash function is suitable, signing a hash
value should be considered the same as signing the entire message.
This quote contains an assumption which is, in our opinion, unreasonable: the manager
expects anyone receiving the signed document to make an unjustified inference, based on
the assumption that “the manager is not careless”. The unjustified inference is to infer a
statement which is not warranted. Of course, any principal including the manager may be
free to desire any behavior from other principals. But is it reasonable to expect beliefs to be
obtained which are not computationally justified?
It is reasonable to assume that any principal, upon seeing {H(N )}K −1 will believe that the
manager has seen and signed H(N ), since it is computationally too difficult for any principal
other than the manager to construct the signature. However, it is not reasonable to assume
that any principal, upon believing that a manager has seen and signed H(N ), believes that
the manager has seen N , as there is no computational problem that would justify such a
belief. Anybody may have computed H(N ) from N , in particular someone may have told
the manager H(N ) but not N . Therefore, the expectation of a manager that other principals
should act as if the manager knows N , is not warranted.
In fact, the text quoted above is the justification of the inference rule H in BAN logic.9
We believe the identified problematic assumption explains the problems that arise from the
inference rule H.
The hashing inference rule H reads, as given on page 266 of [5] (resp. page 42 of [7]):
H P |≡ Q |∼ H(X), P  XP |≡ Q |∼ X
This rule formalizes that if P believes that Q once conveyed H(X), and P receives a
message X , then P may infer that Q knows X .
The message X that P receives, need not be sent by Q. Therefore, this rule is problematic,
as it essentially infers belief (by P) of ‘possession’ (by Q) of the message X from P believing
that Q once conveyed H(X). This rule leads to the ‘unsoundness’ of BAN logic. Fortunately,
none of the authentication logics that descend from BAN logic, adopts the H inference rule.
Because the most commonly used signature schemes use cryptographic hash functions,
the H inference rule was added to BAN logic to facilitate the analysis of such signature
schemes.
8 Consider the alternative: we do not want principals to believe a message is sent by Santa Claus just because
the name ‘Santa Claus’ is written beneath it; writing the name ‘Santa Claus’ is an exercise just as easy for
Santa Claus himself as it is for anybody else.
9 The name of this inference rule has been given by the writer of this text.
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With this inference rule at hand, we can see how the two parrots protocol demonstrates
the ‘unsoundness’ of BAN logic.
4 The two parrots protocol
To prove the ‘unsoundness’ of BAN logic, we rely on a protocol. The rather simple two
parrots protocol, shown in Fig. 1, will demonstrate the ‘unsoundness’. Alice (denoted A)
chooses a random number N , sends it to Cecil (denoted C), who returns the number. Then
Alice sends the cryptographic hash of the number to Bob (denoted B), and Bob signs this
hash value and returns it to Alice. As Bob only sees the cryptographic hash value of N ,
and a cryptographic hash function is one-way, Bob does not learn N itself. Of course, Cecil
might privately disclose N to Bob, but this does not happen in the two parrots protocol. Thus,
though by private channels Bob might learn N , the protocol certainly does not guarantee this.
After Alice receives Bob’s message, she knows that Bob received her message containing
the hash value of the random number. However, Alice cannot, as a result of the proto-
col, conclude that Bob knows N . Neither can Alice conclude that Bob does not know N .
Unfortunately, according to the analysis of the two parrots protocol in BAN logic, Alice will
believe that Bob knows N .
In the two parrots protocol, the message N is transmitted without protection. Thus, one
can argue that Bob could learn N by mere eavesdropping. For the sake of simplicity, we use
a very simple protocol that suffices to demonstrate our observation on BAN logic. Of course,
protection of N can be achieved by encryption of the messages between Alice and Cecil. Our
proof can be easily extended to obtain the same result for such an altered protocol. Moreover,
our proof does not rely on Bob eavesdropping.
Thus, though Bob could learn N through either an assistant (Cecil disclosing N to Bob)
or through eavesdropping, the communication in the two parrots protocol simply does not
guarantee that Bob knows N , and therefore also does not warrant Alice believing that Bob
knows N .
When we want to formally analyze the protocol in BAN logic, we need to transcribe it
into BAN logic. First, we have the protocol assumptions
A |≡ K→ B, A |≡ N , A |≡ (N )
which state that A knows the public key K of B, A knows N , and A believes N to be fresh.
A newly generated random number is particularly fresh. Then, we have the protocol itself:
step 1 S1 : A → C : N
step 2 S2 : C → A : N
step 3 S3 : A → B : H(N )
step 4 S4 : B → A : {H(N )}K −1
Fig. 1 The two parrots protocol
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This protocol description is rather straightforward. In general, the message X cryptogra-
phically signed with the private key corresponding to public key K is denoted as {X}K −1 .
Thus, any agent that knows K can verify the signature and read X . In particular, in the two
parrots protocol Alice can verify that message 4 was signed and sent by Bob.
To quickly see how the two parrots protocol interacts with the H inference rule, observe
that message 2 (C → A : N ) can be used to obtain the second precondition of H, and that
message 4 (B → A : {H(N )}K −1 ) can be used to obtain the first precondition of H. Thus,
messages 2 and 4 are the essential messages of the protocol. The other messages can be
considered mere ‘glue’.
What is achieved by a protocol can be stated in claims. For the two parrots protocol, the
following claim is true:
It will not be the case that B |≡ N
which essentially states that B will not know N . Note that this is true because
1. B only sees H(N ),
2. the inverse of H(·) is hard to compute (H(·) is a one-way function), and
3. B has only polynomially many computational resources.
The problem that we identify in BAN logic (see Sect. 6) has the effect that the following
statement can also be inferred in BAN logic:
A |≡ B |≡ N
which states that A will believe that B will know N . This belief of A is not computationally
justified (see Sect. 3).
5 Used inference rules
The proof of ‘unsoundness’ in Sect. 6 involves three inference rules of BAN logic.10 Inference
rule H has already been given in Sect. 3, the other two rules are:
1. the message meaning inference rule number ii as given on page 238 of [5] (resp. page 6
of [7]):
MM P |≡
K→ Q, P  {X}K −1
P |≡ Q |∼ X
This rule formalizes that if P knows Q’s public key, and P receives a message X signed
with Q’s private key, P may infer that Q once sent X .11
2. the nonce-verification inference rule as given on page 238 of [5] (resp. page 6 of [7]):
NV P |≡ (X), P |≡ Q |∼ XP |≡ Q |≡ X
This rule formalizes that if P believes X to be fresh (it originates in the current session),
and P believes that Q once conveyed X , then P may infer that Q believes X (in the
current session).12
10 These names of these inference rules have been given by the writer of this text.
11 Inference rule MM has been questioned by Wedel and Kessler, as it is invalid if interpreted according to
their semantics [35]. However, they point out that it is unclear whether BAN logic itself or their semantics of
BAN logic is to blame for that.
12 This rule relies on the assumption that only beliefs are communicated.
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6 Proof of ‘unsoundness’ of BAN logic
In this section, we will present our formal proof. In our proof, we use the term ‘unjustified
belief’. This might be perceived as unnecessarily harsh or misleading, but we will argue that
this is the right formulation, even in lack of a clear semantics of BAN logic as a whole. The
central construct of BAN logic, |≡, is defined as follows on page 236 of [5] (resp. page 4 of
[7]):
P |≡ X : P believes X , or P would be entitled to believe X . In particular, the principal
P may act as though X is true. This construct is central to the logic.
In our proof, we obtain a result of the form P |≡ X , where X is not warranted. It might
be the case that X were true, if some more communication were to occur than prescribed by
the two parrots protocol and considered in our proof. Therefore, and in this way, we deem
“unjustified belief” the appropriate term for such an X . With this explanation given, let us
formulate our main theorem:
Theorem 1 (‘Unsoundness’ of BAN logic) Within BAN logic (as defined in [5, 7]) it is
possible to derive unjustifiable beliefs. More precisely, a statement of the form A |≡ X can
be derived while it is also consistent to assume that B does not know N.
Proof (derivability) Consider the two parrots protocol, whose BAN idealization is given in
Sect. 4. It is trivial to verify that A, C and B are capable of sending the messages they ought
to send in the two parrots protocol.
As a result of protocol step 2 (S2), the following statement is inserted:
A  N (1)
As a result of protocol step 4 (S4), the following statement is inserted:
A  {H(N )}K −1 (2)
Using inference rule MM, assumption A |≡ K→ B and (2), we can infer:
A |≡ B |∼ H(N ) (3)
Using inference rule H, (3) and (1), we can infer:
A |≡ B |∼ N (4)
Using inference rule NV, assumption A |≡ (N ) and (4), we can infer:
A |≡ B |≡ N (5)
Statement (5) should definitely not be derivable from the two parrots protocol. With all
protocol assumptions satisfied and only valid inferences applied, an unjustifiable belief is
established. More precisely, A believes B |≡ N , while it is also consistent to assume that B
does not know N , and nobody tells B about N . Therefore, A |≡ B |≡ N is unjustified. unionsq
The culprit is the inference rule H. This problem cannot be fixed by adding inference
rules in such a way that B |≡ N can be inferred, as this would thwart the definition of a
cryptographic hash function: then N would be derivable from H(N ). Such a ‘fix’ would
increase the number of computationally unjustified inference rules from (at least) one to two.
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Note that one more inference step is needed after application of the H rule before a false
belief is established. This is because we need to obtain belief of belief, which cannot be
directly inferred from H.13
7 The semantic approach
In the original BAN papers [5, 7], a rather limited semantics is given for a part of the formal
language of BAN logic. This semantics has been subject to an enormous amount of criticism.
For one thing, the semantics is very closely tied to the formal language of BAN logic: what
is derivable in the logic is by definition observable in the semantics. Arguably, the semantics
is so closely tied to the formal language that it is of no additional value. Except for it being
the subject of criticism, the semantics has hardly ever been used.
In Sect. 6 we have explained why we used the formulation “unjustified belief” in a proof
that does not rely on any formal semantics. Therefore, we have consistently used quotes
around the term unsoundness. In this section we will provide a proof based on a semantics:
therefore, we may omit the quotes around unsoundness. However, for this proof we need to
disregard all criticisms of the semantics of BAN logic. Therefore, we regard our proof in the
previous section as more important. But it is of course up to the reader to choose what he
likes best:
1. to agree with our use of “unjustified belief” in the previous section, and with it agree
with the semantics-free proof of ‘unsoundness’ (shown in the previous section), or
2. to accept the semantics of BAN logic, regardless of all its shortcomings, and with it agree
to our proof of unsoundness (shown in this section).
Before we show a run of the two parrots protocol in the semantics of BAN logic, it is
appropriate to summarize this semantics:
– A local state of a principal P at moment i is a tuple (MP , BP ), where MP is the set of
messages seen () by P up to moment i , and BP is the set of beliefs (|≡) of P . These
sets enjoy closure properties which correspond to the inference rules of the logic. For
compactness and ease of reading, we have only included elements in these sets which
are relevant for our purposes. Moreover, i ≤ j implies MP (i) ⊆ MP ( j) and similar
for BP .
– A global state s is a tuple containing the local states of all principals. If s is a global state,
then sP is the local state of P in s and MP (s) and BP (s) are the corresponding sets of
seen messages and beliefs. In our case the principals are A, B and C , and a global state
s is the triple (sA, sB , sC ).
– A run is a finite sequence of global states s0, . . . , sn .
– A protocol run of a protocol of n steps of the form (Pi → Qi : Xi ) is a run of length
n + 1, where s0 corresponds to the protocol assumptions and where Xi 
 MQi (si ) for
all i such that 0 < i ≤ n.
To be able to show a run of the two parrots protocol which is convenient to read, we will
first name and give all local states. Then, we will give the full protocol run in which the
names of these local states are used. For naming the local states, we adhere to the following
convention: sn,...,n
′
P is the local state of principal P in the global states n, . . . , n′.
13 Note that in BAN logic, the semantics of belief (|≡) is defined, while the semantics of once said (|∼) is still
“largely a mystery” (literal quote from [5, 7, 4]).
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A = ( ∅, {
K→ B, N , (N )} )
s
2,3
A = ( {N }, {
K→ B, N , (N )} )
s4A = ( {N , {H(N )}K −1}, {
K→ B, N , (N ),




B = ( ∅, ∅ )
s
3,4
B = ( {H(N )} {H(N ), {H(N )}K −1} )
MC BC
s0C = ( ∅, ∅ )
s
1,2,3,4
C = ( {N } {N } )
(6)
The following is a run of the two parrots protocol:
s0, s1, s2, s3, s4 (7)
where si are the global states after the consecutive steps of the protocol:
sA sB sC
s0 = ( s0,1A s0,1,2B s0C )
s1 = ( s0,1A s0,1,2B s1,2,3,4C )
s2 = ( s2,3A s0,1,2B s1,2,3,4C )
s3 = ( s2,3A s3,4B s1,2,3,4C )
s4 = ( s4A s3,4B s1,2,3,4C )
(8)
Now that we have specified a protocol run of the two parrots protocol, we can give our
alternative proof of unsoundness:
Theorem 2 (Unsoundness of BAN logic) Within BAN logic (as defined in [5, 7]) it is possible
to derive false beliefs from true premises. More precisely, a statement of the form A |≡ X
can be derived while the statement X itself is false.
Proof (observability) As shown in statement (5) of the derivability proof in Sect. 6, we can
derive in BAN logic the sentence A |≡ B |≡ N in every run S1, S2, S3, S4 of the two parrots
protocol. Thus, we have:
S1, S2, S3, S4 |−A |≡ B |≡ N (9)
Global state s4 corresponds to the semantics after a particular protocol run S1, S2, S3, S4
of the two parrots protocol. That is, a protocol run in which no eavesdropping occurs and
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no extra messages are sent. When we take the model as given in equations (6)–(8), we can
observe that ‘A believes that B knows N ’: B |≡ N ∈ BA(s4), which gives us:
s4 | A |≡ B |≡ N (10)
On the other hand, we can also observe in our model that ‘B does not know N ’: N /∈ BB(s4),
which gives us:
s4 | B |≡ N (11)
Thus, the belief of A as given in (10) is not true in a particular protocol run as shown in
(11). The false belief of A as given in (10), is nevertheless derivable (9) in every protocol
run. Thus, it is possible to derive a false belief within BAN logic. unionsq
Let us quote one last excerpt from Sect. 13, on page 269 of [5] (resp. pages 47–48 of [7]):
Clearly, some beliefs are false. This seems essential to a satisfactory semantics. […]
Most beliefs happen to be true in practice, but the semantics does not account for this
coincidence. To guarantee that all beliefs are true we would need to guarantee that all
initial beliefs are true.
The existence of false beliefs in the semantics as such is not a problem, the problem is
that some false beliefs are derivable from true ones.
8 Discussion
The formal approach to protocol analysis essentially started with BAN logic. Many critiques
of BAN logic have appeared, mentioning its incompleteness (i.e., inability to detect some
obvious problems, cf. [26]) and its poor semantics (among many others, see [2]). Nevertheless,
these critiques have not been a reason to abandon the way of thinking introduced by BAN logic
[20]. The many augmentations to BAN logic (most notably, AT [2], GNY [17], AUTLOG
[21, 35], VO [27], SVO [32, 33] and SVD [13]) show the trust in the formal approach which
originates from BAN logic. In our opinion, this consensual trust in the way of thinking
introduced by BAN logic is justified. While obtaining completeness has long been regarded
as impossible, the soundness of BAN logic itself has never been seriously doubted. Wedel
and Kessler identified rules in BAN, AT and GNY which are invalid in their semantics, but
they point out that it is unclear whether the inference rules or their semantics are to blame for
that [35]. Various more recent results [1, 10–12, 31] provide directions on how completeness
could be obtained for formal protocol analysis.
Our ‘unsoundness’ result does not at all invalidate the approach that BAN logic employs
for protocol analysis. It should merely count as a warning to those who wish to complete
their logic. All augmentations of BAN logic are incomplete in the sense that they do not
accommodate all cryptographic primitives known to date. These logics are essentially ‘just
big enough’ to capture the problems the authors intend to capture. And to be fair, this has
been difficult enough already. Just a few BAN-descendant logics accommodate cryptographic
hash functions, none of them accommodate fancy primitives like (to name just an example)
oblivious transfer [29, 15].
The problem we identified in this paper can be addressed by removing the inference rule
H from the set of allowed rules in BAN logic. Removing one known problem does of course
not guarantee the absence of other problems. Therefore, it might still be that even then BAN is
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‘unsound’ or even unsound (without quotes), but at least not as a result of problems identified
in this paper. The inference rule H is not vital for most applications of BAN logic. In [34]
we propose some candidate inference rules which may be added to BAN-like logics in case
the logic does need to model hash functions.
The fact that none of the hash-accommodating BAN-descendant logics adopts the H
inference rule, can probably be explained by the observation that constructing a good logic is
already so difficult that none of the authors will have felt the urge to include an inference rule
into their logic that was not needed to capture the problem the author intended to capture.
Nevertheless, it is remarkable that we are apparently the first to find this result on a paper
which has been so extensively studied and which is almost two decades old.
So far, we know of only one publication which relies on the faulty H inference rule [3].
In this publication, the SET protocol14 is analyzed in BAN logic. It remains open whether
the authors’ assessment of SET holds in a BAN logic with the inference rule H omitted.
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Appendix A: a taxonomy of versions of the BAN paper
The seminal paper “A logic of authentication” has a respectable number of versions. Its
precursor, “Authentication: a practical study in belief and action” was presented at the second
conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge in March 1988 [4, 18
pages]. Then, there is the DEC technical report, which was published in February 1989 and
revised in February 1990 [7, 49 pages]. In April 1989, the work was submitted to the Royal
Society of London, which published it in December 1989 [5, 39 pages]. Also in December
1989, a revised version of the article was presented on the twelfth ACM Symposium on
Operating Systems Principles, which was also published in the ACM SIGOPS Operating
Systems Review [6, 13 pages]. This led to a paper in the ACM Transactions on Computer
Systems in February 1990 [8, 19 pages]. In May 1994, an appendix to the DEC technical
report was published [9, 10 pages].
The most notable distinction between these versions is that in the ACM-published versions
and the DEC appendix, the notation of many operators has changed from symbols (e.g. |≡)
to linguistic terms (e.g. believes). These versions refer to the DEC technical report for full
reference. The DEC technical report and the Royal Society version [7, 5] should be considered
the most complete versions, due to their size and the fact that these papers are most often
used in self-references of the authors. Martín Abadi considers the Royal Society version the
most definite one (on his homepage). These two versions of the article contain a Sect. 12, “On
Hashing”, which introduces and discusses the inference rule essential in this paper. These
two versions also contain a Sect. 13, “Semantics”, which defines the partial semantics for
BAN logic, used in Sect. 7 of this paper.
14 SET stands for Secure Electronic Transactions [22–24]. The protocol was introduced by VISA and Mas-
tercard for online payments, but it has never been widely adopted or deployed.
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